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Abstract
Our society is increasingly moving towards richer forms of information exchange where mobility of processes and devices plays
a prominent role. This tendency has prompted the academic community to study the security problems arising from such mobile
environments, and in particular, the security policies regulating who can access the information in question.
In this paper we describe a calculus for mobile processes and propose a mechanism for specifying access privileges based on
a combination of the identity of the users seeking access, their credentials, and the location from which they seek it, within a
reconfigurable nested structure.
We define BACIR, a boxed ambient calculus extended with a Distributed Role-Based Access Control mechanism where each
ambient controls its own access policy. A process in BACIR is associated with an owner and a set of activated roles that grant
permissions for mobility and communication. The calculus includes primitives to activate and deactivate roles. The behavior of
these primitives is determined by the process’s owner, its current location and its currently activated roles. We consider two forms
of security violations that our type system prevents: (1) attempting to move into an ambient without having the authorizing roles
granting entry activated and (2) trying to use a communication port without having the roles required for access activated. We
accomplish (1) and (2) by giving a static type system, an untyped transition semantics, and a typed transition semantics. We then
show that a well-typed program never violates the dynamic security checks.
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1. Introduction
The exchange of information by electronic means in a mobile environment has become commonplace, with
cellphones, PDA’s, and laptop computers accessing remote information and transmitting signals and data. An
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increasingly mobile workforce needs to be able to access corporate information while at work, from home, and on the
road. This tendency has led the academic community to study the security problems arising from this ever increasing
mobility.
One aspect of secure computing is the control of who gains access to which shared and sensitive computing
resources. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [15,26,16] is a standardized methodology for defining security policies
and for giving privileges to users, based on using roles as an abstraction representing a set of activities to be performed.
Access is fundamentally controlled by roles. On one side, each user of a system is associated with a set of roles. On
the other side, each role is associated with a set of permissions (access privileges to existing resources). Some roles
may be mutually exclusive, and others may be deactivated leaving the user with only a subset of the full set of roles
with which she is associated. Therefore, in simple RBAC, a user is granted an access privilege to a resource if one of
her activated roles has that privilege. This factorization of access control simplifies the administration of the security
policy by allowing the systems administrator to separately decide which resources a given role needs in order to
successfully operate, and what roles to assign to each user. It also allows for the choice of authentication method to
be handled separately. How to enrich RBAC by adding orderings and other forms of structure on the roles and the
privileges is an active area of research. They all share in common the separation of concerns given by the introduction
of roles. RBAC, however, is not concerned with the authentication of users. Whether the user claiming to be Bob is
indeed Bob precedes the application of access control, and is beyond the scope of this work.
Mobility adds a new dimension to RBAC, since the services available to a given user also depend on the location
of the user, agreements between parties, and the technology underlying the connection. For example, without roaming
agreements in place, a cellphone may be rendered useless beyond the scope of its provider’s network. Furthermore,
whether a user’s connection is wireless, wired, secure, or insecure also conditions the available services. For example,
an administrator on an insecure wireless connection may be denied access to sensitive information. In a distributed
environment the policies regulating access control may be distributed among several parties, and each principal may
only have partial knowledge of the overall security policy [24,25,23]. In a mobile environment, different domains will
have different access policies and when users (and potentially programs) migrate from domain to domain the access
policy governing them will change with their enclosing domain.
Role-based access control is currently a popular mechanism for governing the access to databases, files, executable
programs and other computational resources. In networking there is another kind of access control that is done by
packet filtering. A given router may be configured to drop all SMTP or HTTP packets denying access to certain
services of a domain from outside that domain. Here, there is no notion of user and role, but only IP domain and
packet type. However, it can be beneficial to have a finer-grain access control that is aware of roles and network
domains. Consider the following example:
The University of Wizbrau is equipped with intelligent buildings, and students carry their laptops with them
to class. While in the classroom, students have only limited Internet access and they are not allowed to use
e-mail, instant messenger, or visit general websites. However, these activities are allowed when done from the
student lounge instead. Since the instructor of the course needs a greater access to resources than the students,
those activities locally disabled to the students are available to the instructor. For example, during a lecture, the
instructor may consult her e-mail to address a question raised by a student in an e-mail message.
The restrictions placed on users in this environment need to be sensitive to both the location of the user (classroom
versus lounge) as well as the role (student versus instructor). Such fine-grained control is not readily handled by either
packet filtering or RBAC.
In this paper we design a formal language featuring formal notions for resource, access, computation,
communication, location and mobility. The starting point of our design is a mobile ambient calculus in the style
of [10], where principals and locations are modeled by ambients. This formal language further includes a type system
based on roles and localized role-based access control. We further show that well-typed programs in this system do
not attempt unauthorized access to resources.
1.1. Background on ambient calculi
In Cardelli and Gordon’s Mobile Ambients (MA) [11], ambients represent nested computational environments
containing data and live computation. In a nutshell, ambients are administrative units forming a dynamic hierarchy,
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where an ambient can move up and down the hierarchy by moving into a sibling or a parent ambient. Furthermore, a
mobile ambient is a communicating entity that can exchange information with parents and children. MA are capable
of moving under the influence of the process they enclose and can dissolve their perimeter with an open operation.
Mobile Ambients provide a direct characterization of computational processes as well as computational devices.
Boxed Ambients (BA) [6] evolved from MA, by removing the ability of an ambient to dissolve its boundary. In
BA, an ambient is a “box” that cannot be opened. This notion of closed ambient provides a complete encapsulation
of the agents they contain. To enable the communication lost by disabling the open operation, ambients are equipped
with communication channels to exchange information with adjacent ambients (parent and children ambients).
Both in MA and BA, ambient mobility is commanded by processes inside the ambient. The commands for mobility
are called capabilities. The capabilities tell an ambient to open or move inside or outside another ambient. Unrestricted
mobility, however, can lead to undesired interferences between two concurrent processes. To address this concern,
control over capabilities was first introduced in Safe Ambients [21] and later used in New Boxed Ambients (NBA) [8]
in the form of co-capabilities. A capability can be exercised only in the presence of a matching co-capability. Hence,
in order to enter an ambient using the in capability, that ambient must contain a matching in co-capability authorizing
that access; similarly for exiting using the out capability.
Boxed Ambients with Communication Interfaces (BACI) [3], introduced the notion of local views. In this calculus,
each ambient has an associated communication port and a local view. The communication port is used for sending
and receiving messages to and from other ambients, and the local view represents the communication types that are
used by the processes enclosed inside the ambient. BACI is flexible enough to allow an ambient to communicate
with different parents using different types. However, this flexibility came with the price of a rather complex syntax
and some runtime type checking required to guarantee type safety. BACIv2 [17] further enhanced communication
mechanisms and mobility control by introducing multiple communication ports, access control lists, and port hiding.
Motivated by our earlier work on BACI [3], we define a typed boxed ambient calculus called BACIR extended with
a Distributed Role-Based Access Control mechanism where each ambient controls its own access policy. Following
the style of BACI, our new calculus distinguishes between names of ambients and names of communication ports.
Ambients are used for mobility and ports are used for communication, either locally within the main process of an
ambient or between a parent and a child. This distinction is instrumental in defining our RBAC mechanism, since it
provides for a finer grain in the security policy. Each kind of ambient (as determined by its name) controls its own
access policy by specifying which roles a user may activate for it, and which roles are sufficient to allow another
ambient to enter it. Similarly, each kind of ambient specifies for the ports it generates which roles can read from it
and which roles can write to it. The idea behind grouping ambients by name is that the name should indicate the
general task to be performed, and all ambients of the same name should be uniform in the way they interact with other
ambients.
An ambient in BACIR is associated with an owner and a set of activated roles that grant permissions for mobility
and communication. The calculus includes primitives to activate and deactivate roles. The behavior of these primitives
is determined by the owner of the ambient, its current location, and its currently activated roles. In order for an ambient
to activate a role, the security policy has to allow the owner of the ambient to do so. Moreover, deactivating roles should
not remove the roles authorizing the ambient to be in its current location.
We consider two forms of security violations that our type system prevents: (1) attempting to move into an ambient
without having the authorizing roles granting entry activated and (2) trying to use a communication port without
having the roles required for access activated. We accomplish (1) and (2) by giving a static type system in Section 3,
an untyped transition semantics, and a typed transition semantics in Section 4. We then show that a well-typed program
never violates the dynamic security checks.
This paper is a revision of the extended abstract [12] that appeared in the proceedings of the international
symposium Trustworthy Global Computing, 2005. The work here differs from that in the abstract in the following
ways: Firstly, the grammar of our language, and correspondingly the type system and transition rules, have been
simplified by the removal of cases that were semantically equivalent to other constructs. Secondly, our discussion of
the typed dynamic semantics is abbreviated here, where it was fully expanded in the earlier version. Lastly, we have
added the details of how to encode the example of the student versus the instructor in the classroom in our calculus,
and described how the type system prevents the unwanted network actions from taking place. Due to the nature of the
special issue, we could not include technical details such as a complete definition of the operational semantics and
extensive proofs of our results.
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Table 1
Syntax of BACIR
Capabilities:
C ::=i capability variable
| in m enter
| out m exit
| C1.C2 path
Basic types
τ ::=amb(ρin , σ ) ambient type
| cap(ρin , σ ) capability type
Messages:
M, N ::=m ambient name
| C capability
Actions:
pi ::=C(c :σ) capability
| K (c :σ) co-capability
| activate〈r〉 activate role r
| deactivate〈r〉 deactivate role r
| (x1, . . . , xk )η input
| 〈M1, . . . ,Mk 〉η output
Co-Capabilities:
K ::=in allow enter
| out allow exit
Communication types
σ ::=shh no exchange
| (ρr , ρw, τ ) exchange tuple
Locations:
η::=↑ c parent port c
| ↓ c child port c
| ? local
Processes:
P ::=0 nil process
| P1 | P2 composition
| ν(n :τ)P ambient name restriction
| ν(c :σ)P port name restriction
| !P replication
| pi.P prefixing
| mu [P ]@ρ ambient
2. Syntax of BACIR
Based on our earlier work on BACI [3], we define BACIR, a boxed ambient calculus with a Distributed Role-
Based Access Control mechanism, where the location of an ambient conditions its privileges. The intuitive idea is that
to accommodate security checking an ambient is associated with its owner and with a set of roles that are currently
activated. This set of roles can be changed by activation and deactivation primitives. Whether a role can be activated
or deactivated depends on the location of the ambient and its owner. This control is made explicit in the type system
where the type of an ambient has a set of roles authorizing the entrance of ambients. Going back to the example,
the professor can send mail because she can activate the faculty mail role, while the students can only activate the
student mail role, which is not enough to qualify to send mail in the classroom.
In order to define the syntax of BACIR we use the following disjoint categories of identifiers:
User Names: u, v ∈ Users Ambient Names: n,m ∈ Amb
Roles: r ∈ Roles Capability Variables: i ∈ CapVar
Port Names: c, c′ ∈ C Message Identifiers: x ∈ Amb ∪ CapVar
We assume a fixed set Users of users, a fixed set Roles of roles, and a fixed function UserPolicy associating each
ambient, user and set of currently activated roles with a set of roles that may become activated for the given ambient.
We use nc to range over Amb ∪ C, and ϕ to be either a basic type or a communication type. The syntax of BACIR is
presented in Table 1.
BACIR may be seen as an extension of the pi -calculus. Processes and Actions are the two main syntactic categories.
We add to the processes of the pi -calculus that of ambients. Further, we modify restriction to apply only to ambient
names, which are distinct from port names (a.k.a. channel names). The pi -calculus actions of input and output
are modified to provide the location of the communication port (parent, child, or local). We add to these actions
those for activation and deactivation of roles and those for requesting and granting permission for movement of
ambients (capabilities and co-capabilities). Capabilities and co-capabilities, in addition to controlling the movement
of ambients, introduce port names and provide their scope. Capabilities include paths (sequences of movement
requests) to allow directions to be passed to an ambient directing it to a specific location. All the capabilities in
the path except the last involve no communication and generate no port.
We introduce the usual notion of process equivalence through the structural congruence generated by alpha
conversion, associativity and commutativity of parallel composition with 0 for identity, and the rules given in Table 2.
The rules for replication and restriction are fairly standard. We add a rule for allowing restriction to pass through an
ambient, provided that ambient is not the one whose name is being restricted. (The functions fn and fp give the free
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Table 2
Structural equivalence
!P ≡ P |!P (STRUCT REP PAR)
ν(nc :ϕ)ν(nc′ :ϕ′)P ≡ ν(nc′ :ϕ′)ν(nc :ϕ)P (STRUCT RES RES)
ν(nc :ϕ)(P1 | P2) ≡ P1 | ν(nc :ϕ)P2, if nc /∈ fn(P) ∪ fp(P) (STRUCT RES PAR)
ν(nc :ϕ)mu [P ]@ρ ≡ mu [ν(nc :ϕ)P ]@ρ, if nc 6= m (STRUCT RES AMB)
(C1.C2)(c :σ).P ≡ C1(c′ :σ ′).(C2(c :σ).P), where c′ 6∈ fp(P) (STRUCT PREFIX)
Table 3
Typing of ambient names, capabilities, messages, and locations
AMBIENT NAME:
Γ (m) = amb(ρin , σ )
Γ ` m : amb(ρin , σ )
VARIABLE:
Γ (i) = cap(ρin , σ )
Γ ` i : cap(ρin , σ )
PATH:
Γ ` C1 : cap(ρin , σ ′)
Γ ` C2 : cap(ρin , σ )
Γ ` C1.C2 : cap(ρin , σ )
ENTER / EXIT TO:
Γ ` m : amb(ρin , σ )
Γ ` in /out m : cap(ρin , σ )
PARENT/
CHILD PORT :
Γ (c) = σ
Γ ,m ` ↑ /↓ c : σ
LOCAL:
Γ ` m : amb(ρin , (ρr , ρw, τ ))
Γ ,m ` ? : (Roles,Roles, τ )
ambient names and the free port name, respectively, in a process.) The last rule tells us that to follow a path is the
same as to follow it in pieces. This makes sense because ambients can only enter one other ambient at a time.
3. Types for security
Attempting to enter an ambient without an authorizing role activated is a security violation. Trying to use a
communication port without having activated at least one of the required roles to access the port is also a security
violation. In this section we define a type system such that well-typed processes can compute without committing
security violations. The type of a process is a set of roles sufficient for it to compute without security violations. In
particular, the type of an ambient name is the set of roles needed for mobility and communication.
The syntax of types can be found in Table 1. Basic types describe the kind of data to be communicated over a port,
either ambient name or capability, together with the roles sufficient for entrance and the communication type of the
associated ambient. The communication type includes the sets of roles ρr and ρw granting read and write access to a
port. In this presentation of the calculus, we allow only ambient names and capabilities to be passed over ports, but not
port names. Allowing the communication of computational types such as the integers does not affect the results here.
The type system is defined with the following judgments. We give here only a partial presentation of the system.
Capabilities Γ ` C : (ρin, σ ) Locations Γ ,m ` η : σ
Messages Γ ` M : τ Actions Γ , ρdeact , ρact ,m, u ` pi : (Γ ′, ρ′act )
Processes Γ , ρdeact ,m, u ` P : ρact
In Tables 3 and 4, let Γ be a typing environment mapping message identifiers to basic types and port names to
communication types. We further require that Γ (m) be an ambient type for ambient names, and Γ (i) be a capability
type for capability variables (the two sorts of message identifiers). The typing judgment for a process is of the form
Γ , ρdeac,m, u ` P : ρact , where Γ is the typing environment for free message identifiers and port names, m is the
assumed surrounding ambient, u is the current user (owner of m), ρdeact is the set of roles that the process may at any
time in its computation safely deactivate, and ρact is the set of “currently active” roles. The judgments for the other
syntactic categories are similar.
Typing of ambients and capabilities is mostly as would be expected. However, we should note that only the
communication type of the right-most component in a path is used for the communication type of the whole path.
To type local communication, we use the ambient assumed as the surrounding ambient, and we want no restrictions
on reading or writing. However, it is important that we maintain the restrictions on the types of data transmitted.
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Table 4
Well-typed actions and processes
CAPABILITIES:
Γ ` C : cap(ρin , σ )
(ρact − ρdeact ) ∩ ρin 6= ∅
Γ , ρdeact , ρact ,m, u
` C(c :σ) : (Γ + (c :σ), ρact )
CO-CAPABILITIES:
Γ ` m : amb(ρin , σ )
Γ , ρdeact , ρact ,m, u
` K (c :σ) : (Γ + (c :σ), ρact )
ACTIVATION:
r ∈ UserPolicy(u, ρact )
Γ , ρdeact , ρact ,m, u
` activate〈r〉 : (Γ , ρact ∪ {r})
DEACTIVATION:
r ∈ ρdeact
Γ , ρdeact , ρact , ,m, u
` deactivate〈r〉 : (Γ , ρact − {r})
INPUT:
m 6∈ {x1, . . . , xk }
Γ ,m ` η : (ρr , ρw, τ )
(ρact − ρdeact ) ∩ ρr 6= ∅
Γ , ρdeact , ρact ,m, u
` (x1, . . . , xk )η : (Γ +Σ ki=1{xi :τ }, ρact )
OUTPUT:
Γ ,m ` η : (ρr , ρw, τ )
Γ ` Mi : τ i = 1, . . . , k
(ρact − ρdeact ) ∩ ρw 6= ∅
Γ , ρdeact , ρact ,m, u
` 〈M1, . . . ,Mk 〉η : (Γ , ρact )
COMPOSITION:
Γ , ρdeact ,m, u ` P1 : ρact
Γ , ρdeact ,m, u ` P2 : ρact
Γ , ρdeact ,m, u ` P1 | P2 : ρact
REPLICATION:
Γ , ρdeact ,m, u ` P : ρact
Γ , ρdeact ,m, u `!P : ρact
NIL:
Γ , ρdeact ,m, u ` 0 : ρact
NAME RESTRICTION:
nc 6= m Γ + (nc :ϕ), ρdeact ,m, u ` P : ρact
Γ , ρdeact ,m, u ` ν(nc :ϕ)P : ρact
PREFIXING:
Γ , ρdeact , ρact ,m, u ` pi : (Γ ′, ρ′act )
Γ ′, ρdeact ,m, u ` P : ρ′act
Γ , ρdeact ,m, u ` pi.P : ρact
AMBIENT:
m ∈ dom(Γ ) Γ , ρ′deact ,m, v ` P : ρm
Γ , ρdeact ,m
′, u ` mv[P ]@ρm : ρact
We could violate the security policy if we omitted the type checks on messages locally communicated, because we
potentially could send a capability with one security policy, but receive it with a different one.
The rules for typing actions and processes appear in Table 4. Actions are the basic unit of work in processes. They
have the potential for changing the set of variables in scope, the current position and hence the current authorizing
policy, and the set of activated roles. Thus the type of an action is a tuple of the revised typing environment, the revised
authorizing policy, and the revised set of activated roles. Capabilities change the current location and introduce a new
port, while co-capabilities only introduce a new port. Activation adds a new role, if it is allowed by the policy, and
deactivation removes it provided it is in the set of roles safe for deactivation. Inputting a message introduces a tuple
of new message variables. Outputting a message does not change the typing environment.
Processes are the outermost level of syntax. The main rules to note are those for prefixes and ambients (PREFIXING
and AMBIENT in Table 4). For prefixes, we must type the action at the head to derive a new typing environment, new
authorizing policy, and a new set of active roles, and then use these instead of the originals to check the remaining
process. The typing for an ambient throws away the surrounding ambient information and checks the ambient in
isolation. Since an ambient may travel into other ambients with unknown active roles, an ambient must be secure
relative to the context it carries with itself.
3.1. Typing lemmas
Before moving on to operational semantics, let us collect a few useful lemmas about the typing relation described
in this section.
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Lemma 1 (Port Weakening). If Γ , ρdeact ,m, u ` P : ρact and c 6∈ fp(P) then Γ + (c : σ), ρdeact ,m, u ` P : ρact .
Proof (Outline). It follows by induction on the derivation of Γ , ρdeact ,m, u ` P : ρact , using that Γ + (c : σ)+ (c :
σ ′) = Γ + (c : σ ′) and Γ + (c : σ)+ (c′ : σ ′) = Γ + (c′ : σ ′)+ (c : σ) for c 6= c′. Similar results for the other kinds
of judgments follow using the same argument.
A similar result holds for variable weakening.
Lemma 2 (Port Substitution). If Γ + (c : σ), ρdeact ,m, u ` P : ρact and c′ /∈ (fp(P) − {c}) then Γ + (c′ :
σ), ρdeact ,m, u ` P{c := c′} : ρact .
Lemma 3 (Message Substitution). Let x1, . . . , xk be variables, and M1, . . . ,Mk be messages we wish to
simultaneously substitute for x1, . . . , xk . Let Γ and Γ ′ be two environments such that for all port names c, we have
Γ (c) = Γ ′(c), and for all variables y /∈ {x1, . . . , xk}, we have Γ (y) = Γ ′(y). Also assume that Γ (xi ) = τi and
Γ ′ ` Mi : τi for all i = 1, . . . , k. If Γ , ρdeact ,m, u ` P : ρact then Γ ′, ρdeact ,m{xi := Mi |i = 1, . . . , k}, u `
P{xi := Mi |i = 1, . . . , k} : ρact .
Lemma 4 (Role Expansion). If UserPolicy is monotonically increasing in its role set argument (i.e., for all ρ, ρ′,
ρ ⊆ ρ′ implies that UserPolicy(u, ρ) ⊆ UserPolicy(u, ρ′)), then Γ , ρdeact ,m, u ` P : ρ and Γ , ρdeact ,m, u ` P :
ρ′, for all ρ, ρ′ with ρ ⊆ ρ′.
4. Operational semantics
Our goal in defining the static type system given in Section 3 is to enable us to prove that if a process type checks
with a given set of roles, then it will never attempt an action that it is not authorized to perform when executed in
a state where all the roles in the set have previously been activated. To this end, we define two transition semantics
for our language, one with dynamic security checks and one without. For the untyped semantics, we have a form
of subject reduction. We also have that, if a process type checks, then it reduces to another process in the untyped
transition system if and only if it reduces to that process in the typed transition system.
4.1. Untyped transition semantics
The untyped transition semantics is given in Table 5. It is worth noting that almost all the reduction rules explicitly
mention a context containing an ambient, except for the rule for LOCAL communication.
The rules for ambient movement (ENTER and EXIT) are the most complicated. For an ambient to ENTER another
the two ambients must be directly in parallel with each other, the first ambient must contain a process requesting
entrance to the second, and the second ambient must have a process allowing the entrance. If these conditions are
met, then the request and permission are consumed and the resulting first ambient enters the resulting second ambient.
Upon entrance, a fresh communication port is created for the two ambients to share (See rules CAPABILITIES and
CO-CAPABILITIES in Table 4). The type of the port is determined by the ambient being entered. For an EXIT action, the
conditions are the same except for the positioning of the ambients: the one requesting to exit must be inside an ambient
which in turn is inside the ambient to which the first wishes to exit. The rules for activation and deactivation cause the
addition or deletion of the given role from the role set of the surrounding ambient. The rules for communication cause
the appropriate substitution when the communicating parties are appropriately positioned. It is worth noting that local
communication is expressly not between ambients, but between ordinary processes, corresponding to communication
in the pi -calculus. In addition to the above rules for top-level reduction, there is a rule allowing us to descend through
compositions, restrictions, and ambients to find a process capable of reducing. In particular, it is worth noting that an
ambient within another ambient may keep computing, even while the outer ambient is blocked. To apply any of these
rules, we may substitute for a process any process which is structurally equivalent to the original one.
4.2. Typed transition semantics
In this section we briefly sketch the transition semantics with runtime type checks. For more details and proofs
of the results in this section, please see [13]. The rules of the semantics augment the processes to be evaluated with
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Table 5
Simple transition system
ENTER: mu [in n (c :σ).P1 | P2 ]@ρm | nv[in (c′ :σ ′).P3 | P4 ]@ρn ⇒
ν(c′′ :σ)nv[mu [P1{c := c′′} | P2 ]@ρm | P3{c′ := c′′} | P4 ]@ρn
EXIT: pw[nv[mu [out p (c :σ).P1 | P2 ]@ρm | P3 ]@ρn | out (c′ :σ ′).P4 | P5 ]@ρp ⇒
ν(c′′ :σ)pw[mu [P1{c := c′′} | P2 ]@ρm | nv[P3 ]@ρn | P4{c := c′′} | P5 ]@ρp
where c′′ is assumed to be a fresh variable in each transition above
ACTIVATE: mu [(activate〈r〉.P) | R ]@ρ ⇒ mu [P | R ]@(ρ ∪ {r})
DEACTIVATE: mu [(deactivate〈r〉.P) | R ]@ρ ⇒ mu [P | R ]@(ρ − {r})
LOCAL: 〈M1, . . . ,Mk 〉?. P | (x1, . . . , xk )?. R ⇒ P | R{xi := Mi |i = 1 . . . k}
TO CHILD (↓): mu [〈M1, . . . ,Mk 〉↓c. P1 | nv[(x1, . . . , xk )↑c.P2 | R1 ]@ρn | R2 ]@ρm
⇒ mu [P1 | nv[P2{xi := Mi |i = 1 . . . k} | R1 ]@ρn | R2 ]@ρm
TO PARENT (↑): nv[mu [〈M1, . . . ,Mk 〉↑c.P1 | R1 ]@ρm | (x1, . . . , xk )↓c. P2 | R2 ]@ρn
⇒ nv[mu [P1 | R1 ]@ρm | P2{xi := Mi |i = 1 . . . k} | R2 ]@ρn
COMPOSITION:
P1 ⇒ R1
P1 | P2 ⇒ R1 | P2
RESTRICTION:
P ⇒ R
ν(nc :ϕ)P ⇒ ν(nc :ϕ)R
AMBIENT:
P ⇒ R
mu [P ]@ρ ⇒ mu [Q ]@ρ
STRUCT:
P ′ ≡ P P ⇒ R R ≡ R′
P ′ ⇒ R′
a typing context in which the evaluation is to take place. This context comprises a typing environment, Γ , as in
Section 3, and a basic type, τ . As usual, the typing environment supplies us with the types for free ambient names
and ports occurring in our process. The basic type is the type of a message that can be locally communicated at top
level. We do not need read and write policies, because there are no security checks on local communication. The typed
reduction relation transforms a process and its context into a new process in a new context. If we ignore the context,
including the premises concerning it, then we get the untyped system in the previous section. The typing environment
and basic type are the extra information we need to carry to do dynamic security checks.
The rules for the typed transition semantics can be grouped into four types: mobility, communication, role change,
and structural. As the rules in each group are quite similar, we give one from each group here. For the remaining rules,
we refer the reader to [13].
Since the reductions on the processes are the same as in the untyped transition semantics, we will focus on the
security checks and the transformations to the typing environment and basic type. When one ambient enters into or
exits to another, we need to know that the entering/exiting ambient has an appropriate role activated authorizing it to
enter, and we need to establish a shared communication port for sending and receiving messages of a type specified
by the host ambient. The new communication port needs to be added to the typing environment. (See EXIT in Table 6.)
The side conditions for the rule for ENTER are comparable to those for EXIT.
The next theorem shows that the typed transition semantics is a refinement of the untyped transition semantics.
Theorem 5. Let P and P ′ be processes, Γ and Γ ′ be typing environments, and τ and τ ′ be basic types. If
(Γ , τ )B P −→ (Γ ′, τ ′)B P ′, then τ = τ ′, Γ = Γ ′, and P ⇒ P ′.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the derivation of (Γ , τ )B P −→ (Γ ′, τ ′)B P ′. A quick inspection shows all the
rules for typed transition have the same environment Γ and same basic type τ on the left of the transition as on the
right in their conclusion. To show that P ⇒ P ′, we use that the only typed transition rules having a typed transition
premise are the structural rules. For the non-structural rules, erasing the environments and basic types leaves us with
the corresponding rules for the untyped transition system. For the structural rules, erasing the environments and types
from both the premises and conclusions yields the corresponding rules from the untyped system.
Theorem 6 can be seen as the combination of two different results. The first one is the traditional Subject
Reduction result that states that evaluation preserves typing, while the second result tells us that runtime type checks
can be omitted on well-typed processes. A side-effect of the latter is that if a process type checks, there is no
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Table 6
Typed transitions
EXIT:
Γ (p) = amb(ρin , σ ) ρm ∩ ρin 6= ∅
c′′ 6∈ ((fp(P1)− {c}) ∪ fp(P2) ∪ fp(P3) ∪ (fp(P4)− {c′}) ∪ fp(P5))
(Γ , τ )B pw[nv[mu [out p (c :σ).P1 | P2 ]@ρm | P3 ]@ρn | out (c′ :σ).P4 | P5 ]@ρp −→
(Γ , τ )B ν(c′′ :σ)pw[mu [P1{c := c′′} | P2 ]@ρm | nv[P3 ]@ρn | P4{c := c′′} | P5 ]@ρp
TO PARENT (↑):
Γ (c) = (ρr , ρw, τ ′) ρm ∩ ρw 6= ∅ ρn ∩ ρr 6= ∅ Γ ` Mi : τ ′ i = 1, . . . , k
(Γ , τ )B nv[mu [〈M1, . . . ,Mk 〉↑c.P1 | R1 ]@ρm | (x1, . . . , xk )↓c. P2 | R2 ]@ρn −→
(Γ , τ )B nv[mu [P1 | R1 ]@ρm | P2{xi := Mi |i = 1 . . . k} | R2 ]@ρn
ACTIVATE:
r ∈ UserPolicy(u, ρ)
(Γ , τ )B mu [(activate〈r〉P) | R ]@ρ −→ (Γ , τ )B mu [P | R ]@(ρ ∪ {r})
RESTRICTION :
(Γ + {nc : ϕ}, τ )B P −→ (Γ ′ + {nc : ϕ}, τ )B R
(Γ , τ )B ν(nc :ϕ)P −→ (Γ ′, τ )B ν(nc :ϕ)R
runtime significance to activation and deactivation, and these operations could be removed after type checking as
an optimization.
Theorem 6 (Subject Reduction and Runtime Typechecks). Let P and Q be processes, m be an ambient name, u
be a user, ρdeact and ρact be sets of roles, and let Γ be a typing environment such that m ∈ dom(Γ ). Let
Γ (m) = amb(ρin, (ρr , ρw, τ )). If Γ , ρdeact , m, u ` P : ρact and P ⇒ Q, then (Γ , τ ) B P −→ (Γ , τ ) B Q,
and if in addition UserPolicy is monotonically increasing in role sets, then Γ , ρdeact , m, u ` Q : ρact .
Proof. We proceed by induction on the derivation of P ⇒ Q and by case analysis on the last rule used. The cases fall
into four main categories: mobility, communication, role change, and structural. The proofs are fairly similar in each
category, so we will describe one case from each category.
EXIT: There exists a fresh variable c′′ (not occurring free in P and Q) such that
P = pw[nv[m′u′[out p (c :σ).P1 | P2 ]@ρm′ | P3 ]@ρn | out (c′ :σ).P4 | P5 ]@ρp⇒ ν(c′′ :σ)pw[nv[P3 ]@ρn | m′u′[P1{c := c′′} ]@ρm′ | P4{c′ := c′′} | P5 ]@ρp = Q
and Γ , ρdeact , m, u ` P : ρact .
By inversion of the typing rules AMBIENT and COMPOSITION we have m′, n, and p ∈ dom(Γ ) and there exist role
sets ρ′deact , ρ′′deact , and ρ′′′deact such that
Γ , ρ′deact , m′, u′ ` out p (c :σ).P1 : ρm′ Γ , ρ′deact , m′, u′ ` P2 : ρm′
Γ , ρ′′deact , n, v ` P3 : ρn
Γ , ρ′′′deact , p, w ` out (c′ :σ ′).P4 : ρp Γ , ρ′′′deact , p, w ` P5 : ρp
By inversion of the rules PREFIXING, CAPABILITIES, CO-CAPABILITIES, EXIT TO, and AMBIENT NAME we have
that σ = σ ′ and there exist role sets ρ′in , ρ′′in , ρ′′′in such that Γ (m′) = amb(ρ′in, σ ′′), Γ (n) = amb(ρ′′in, σ ′′′),
Γ (p) = amb(ρ′′′in, σ ), Γ + (c : σ), ρ′deact , m′, u′ ` P1 : ρm′ , Γ + (c′ : σ), ρ′′′deact , p, w ` P4 : ρp, and
(ρm′ − ρ′deact ) ∩ ρ′′′in 6= ∅, and hence ρm′ ∩ ρ′′′in 6= ∅. Thus, since c′′ was chosen fresh for P , by the EXIT rule
from the typed transition system, we have
(Γ , τ )B pw[nv[m′u′[out p (c :σ).P1 | P2 ]@ρm′ | P3 ]@ρn | out (c′ :σ).P4 | P5 ]@ρp −→
(Γ , τ )B ν(c′′ :σ)pw[nv[P3 ]@ρn | m′u′[P1{c := c′′} ]@ρm′ | P4{c′ :=c′′} | P5 ]@ρp
and thus that (Γ , τ )B P −→ (Γ , τ )B Q.
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Since we have Γ + (c : σ), ρ′deact , m′, u′ ` P1 : ρm′ and Γ + (c′ : σ), ρ′′′deact , p, w ` P4 : ρp by Lemma 2,
since c′′ is fresh for P we have
Γ + (c′′ : σ), ρ′deact , m′, u ` P1{c := c′′} : ρm′ ,
and
Γ + (c′′ : σ), ρ′′′deact , p, w ` P4{c′ := c′′} : ρp.
Also because c′′ is fresh for P , by Lemma 1, we have
Γ + (c′′ : σ), ρ′deact , m′, u ` P2 : ρm′ , Γ + (c′′ : σ), ρ′′deact , n, v ` P3 : ρm′ ,
Γ + (c′′ : σ), ρ′′′deact , p, w ` P5 : ρp.
By repeated application of COMPOSITION and AMBIENT, and finally an application of NAME RESTRICTION we
have Γ , ρdeact , m, u ` Q : ρact . This finishes the case for EXIT. The other mobility case, ENTER, follows a similar
argument, but with fewer uses of AMBIENT and COMPOSITION.
TO PARENT: In this case we have
P = nv[m′u′[〈M1, . . . ,Mk〉↑c.P1 | P2 ]@ρm′ | (x1, . . . , xk)↓c. P3 | P4 ]@ρn,
Q = nv[m′u′[P1 | P2 ]@ρm′ | P3{xi := Mi |i = 1 . . . k} | P4 ]@ρn .
Γ , ρdeact ,m, u ` P : ρact .
By inversion of the typing rules AMBIENT, COMPOSITION, PREFIXING, OUTPUT, INPUT, PARENT PORT, and CHILD
PORT, we have m′ and n ∈ dom(Γ ) and there exist role sets ρ′deact , ρ′′deact , ρ′r , and ρ′w, and a basic type τ ′ such that
Γ , ρ′deact ,m′, u′ ` P1 : ρm′ , Γ + Σ ki=1{xi : τ ′}, ρ′′deact , n, v ` P3 : ρn
Γ , ρ′deact ,m′, u′ ` P2 : ρm′ Γ , ρ′′deact , n, v ` P4 : ρn
Γ ` Mi : τ ′ i = 1, . . . , k n /∈ {x1, . . . , xk}
Γ (c) = (ρ′r , ρ′w, τ ′) (ρn − ρ′′deact ) ∩ ρ′r 6= ∅
(ρm′ − ρ′deact ) ∩ ρ′w 6= ∅
Therefore, we have ρm′ ∩ ρ′w 6= ∅ and ρn ∩ ρ′r 6= ∅, and thus by the typed transition rule TO PARENT we have
(Γ , τ )B P −→ (Γ , τ )B Q
which is the first half of what was to be shown in this case.
Since Γ and Γ + Σ ki=1{xi : τ ′} only differ on {x1, . . . , xk}, and Γ ` Mi : τ ′ for all i = 1 . . . k, and since
n /∈ {x1, . . . , xk}, by Lemma 3, we have that
Γ , ρ′′deact , n, v ` P3{xi := Mi |i = 1 . . . k} : ρn .
By application of COMPOSITION and AMBIENT we have
Γ , ρ′′deact , n, v ` m′u′[P1 | P2 ]@ρm′ : ρn .
By further applications of COMPOSITION and a final application of AMBIENT, we have Γ , ρdeact ,m, u ` Q : ρact ,
which is the second half of what we needed to show in this case.
This finishes the case TO PARENT. The case TO CHILD is almost identical. The last communication case, LOCAL
is similar, but somewhat simpler since it does not need to use the AMBIENT rule. Also in the LOCAL case, channel
types are learned through a combination of the LOCAL and AMBIENT NAME typing rules, instead of PARENT/CHILD
PORT rules.
ACTIVATE: We have
P = m′u′[(activate〈r〉.P1) | P2 ]@ρm′ ⇒ m′u[P1 | P2 ]@(ρm′ ∪ {r}) = Q
and
Γ , ρdeact ,m, u ` m′u′[(activate〈r〉.P1) | P2 ]@ρm′ : ρact .
A. Compagnoni et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 398 (2008) 203–216 213
Table 7
Wizbrau security policy
Ambient User Roles Ambient User Roles
laptop ProfSue {instructor} mail ProfSue {faculty mail}
Dan {student} Dan {student mail}
Chuck {} Chuck {}
classroom / ProfSue {} answer ProfSue {instructor}
lounge / Dan {} Dan {student}
Univ Chuck {sys admin} Chuck {}
Γ (classroom) = amb({student, instructor, faculty mail}, )
Γ (Univ) = Γ (lounge) = amb({student, student mail, instructor, faculty mail}, )
By inversion of the typing rules AMBIENT, COMPOSITION, PREFIXING and ACTIVATION m′ ∈ dom(Γ ) and
there exists a role set ρ′deact such that Γ , ρ′deact ,m′, u′ ` P2 : ρm′ and Γ , ρ′deact ,m′, u′ ` P1 : ρm′ ∪ {r} and
r ∈ UserPolicy(u′, ρm′). Hence, by the typed transition rule ACTIVATE, we have
(Γ , τ )B m′u′[(activate〈r〉.P1) | P2 ]@ρm′ −→ (Γ , τ )B m′u′[P1 | P2 ]@(ρm′ ∪ {r}).
It remains to show that Γ , ρdeact , m, u ` m′u′[P1 | P2 ]@(ρm′ ∪ {r}) : ρact . Since UserPolicy is monotonically
increasing in role sets, by Lemma 4, we have Γ , ρ′deact ,m′, u′ ` P2 : ρm′ ∪ {r}. Therefore, applying the typing rules
COMPOSITION and AMBIENT, we have Γ , ρdeact ,m, u ` m′u′[P1 | P2 ]@(ρm′ ∪ {r}) : ρact , as was to be shown.
The case for DEACTIVATE is similar, but requires observing that if a process type checks with a given role set, then
we can remove any element of the role set ρdeact from the given role set, and the process will still type check with
respect to it.
RESTRICTION: In this case, P = ν(nc :ϕ)P1 and Q = ν(nc :ϕ)Q1 and P1 ⇒ Q1. By inversion of the typing rule
NAME RESTRICTION, we have that nc 6= m and Γ + (nc : ϕ), ρdeact ,m, u ` P1 : ρact . By the induction hypothesis,
we have that (Γ + (nc : ϕ), τ ) B P1 −→ (Γ + (nc : ϕ), τ ) B Q1, and Γ + (nc : ϕ), ρdeact ,m, u ` Q1 : ρact .
Therefore by the typed transition rule RESTRICTION we have (Γ , τ )B ν(nc :ϕ)P1 −→ (Γ , τ )B ν(nc :ϕ)Q1 and by
the typing rule NAME RESTRICTION we have Γ , ρdeact ,m, u ` ν(nc :ϕ)Q1 : ρact , as was to be shown.
In the cases for the other structural rules, COMPOSITION, RESTRICTION, AMBIENT, and STRUCT EQUIV, the
proof proceeds in a similar manner using the induction hypothesis.
The typed transition semantics developed in this section was primarily introduced as a vehicle to formalize the
benefit of static type checking. It is worth noting that this semantics is of value in its own right. The static rules are
predicated on static access to the information as to which roles are granted access to which resources. With the typed
transition semantics, we can still perform security checks even in a situation where the control policy is only known
at runtime.
5. Example: The university of Wizbrau
To see the utility of the calculus discussed in this paper, let us see how we could use it to express an example where
we need to combine mobility with localized checking of access authorization to local resources. Recall the example
outlined in the introduction of the university with classrooms where students’ access to the Internet is more limited
than that of the instructor. Let {ProfSue,Dan,Chuck} be users representing the instructor in the class, a student in
the class, and the systems administrator for the classrooms in the university. There are five roles available, student,
student mail, instructor, faculty mail and sys admin. To send mail, one should use an ambient namedmail. To use
the automated class response system, one should use an ambient named answer. The laptops of the students and the
instructor will be represented by ambients named laptop, the classroom ambient will be named classroom and the
student lounge ambient will be named lounge. The classroom and the student lounge are part of the Univ ambient.
The user policy and a partial initial typing environment are given in Table 7. For this example, the user policy
does not depend on the currently active policies, and they are omitted in the table. For brevity, we will also omit
communication types from the typing environment description.
The basic program for both the classroom and the student lounge is the same. It allows other ambients to come and
go, provided they have the right roles activated. For those entering, no communication is done. For those exiting, a
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path to a router is provided. The program for the instructor is to enter the classroom and send some mail, in parallel
with some other work. The student enters the classroom, answers some questions, but also wants to send some mail.
Here we can examine some options that fail, together with one that works. The formal processes are listed below.
To assist in examining the possibilities for Dan, his process will be parameterized by the role activated for the mail
ambient and the ambient to which themail ambient tries to exit.
ClassRoom = classroomChuck[!in (c).0 | !out (c′).〈path to router〉.0 ]@{}
Lounge = loungeChuck[!in (c).0 | !out (c′).〈path to router〉.0 ]@{}
mail amb(user, role, amb) =
mailuser [activate〈role〉.out amb c.(i)↑c.i(c′).PDM ]@{}
ProfSuesLaptop =
laptopProfSue
[
activate〈instructor〉.in classroom c.
(mail amb(ProfSue, faculty mail, classroom) | P)
]
@{}
answer amb = answerDan[activate〈student〉.out classroom c.(i)↑c.i(c′).PDA ]@{})
DansLaptop(role, amb) =
laptopDan
[
activate〈student〉.in classroom c.(!answer amb |
mail amb(Dan, role, amb) | out Univ c.in lounge c′.Q)
]
@{}
The total process, parameterized by the arguments for the ambient DansLaptop then is:
UnivChuck[ClassRoom | Lounge | ProfSuesLaptop | DansLaptop(role, amb) ]@{}.
Using the untyped transition system, both ProfSuesLaptop and DansLaptop will enter the ClassRoom and will
be able to send mail. More precisely, the untyped transition rules will allow the ambients laptopProfSue and laptopDan
to enter the classroomChuck ambient and send out their mailDan and mailProfSue ambients.
Using the typed transition system, both ProfSuesLaptop and DansLaptop still can enter the ClassRoom.
However, when the mailDan ambient attempts to exit DansLaptop to the classroom ambient, it will fail because
mailDan will not have an authorizing role activated. This is caught both statically by type checking and dynamically by
runtime type checks in the typed transition system for the process where role is student mail, and amb is classroom.
To understand how type checking and typed transitions proceed, we need to consider the restriction imposed by
the user policy and the typing environment. The UserPolicy in Table 7 says, among other policy statements, that
mailDan can only activate student mail, and the typing environment Γ states that in order to enter classroom an
ambient has to have at least one of the roles in {student, instructor, faculty mail} activated. Therefore, the ambient
mailDan cannot enter the classroom ambient. By the same argument, the UserPolicy says that mailProfSue can
activate the role faculty mail and enter the classroom ambient. The total process will type check if and only if
role = student mail and amb = lounge or Univ. If role takes any other value, then the activation inmail will fail to
type check because of the user policy. If role = student mail, then amb cannot be classroom, since, by the typing
environment, student mail is not sufficient to grant entrance to classroom.
6. Related work
For a variety of calculi for mobile and distributed systems that have emerged in recent years, access control was
one of the primary concerns. The proposed access control mechanisms range from simple ones that use co-actions [22,
28,3] allowing or denying all access to a particular location (and the resources it contains) to more refined ones that
use different approaches: credentials to authorize the access [7], restricted groups [9,14], Mandatory Access Control
mechanisms to constrain unauthorized access [5], and even “membranes” that specify security policies for controlling
the access to a particular location [18].
The work most closely related to our study of RBAC for an ambient calculus is [4]. The authors define a distributed
pi -calculus (D-pi ) based on [19] with primitives to activate and deactivate roles. However, there is no notion of an
individual privilege being disabled or enabled depending on the current location, and the domain topology is static:
domains cannot move. In [20] Hennessy and Riely introduce a type system for a distributed version of the pi -calculus
for restricting the access of processes to resources based on the current location of the process. In this work, again the
domain topology is static, and there is no direct connection to RBAC.
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At the Symposium on Trustworthy Global Computing 2005 (TGC 2005), during his invited address, Matthew
Hennessy presented a calculus for RBAC based on D-pi . Unlike our system, his calculus has dependent types to avoid
dynamic type checks of the security policy.
The work of RBAC in [24,25] does not deal with the implementation of an RBAC mechanism in a given calculus
as is the case in [4]. Instead they define a calculus to describe an RBAC security policy and how to answer queries to
the security policy.
Various groups have developed methods for guaranteeing that specifications of RBAC systems are consistent. In
[27], Schaad and Moffett discuss the application of formal methods for the development of specifications of a conflict-
free role-based system. In [1] a formal language for the specification of role-based authorization constraints, including
prohibition, is introduced. Bertino et al. [2] develop a logical framework for reasoning about access control models in
general, including RBAC models.
7. Conclusions and future work
We defined BACIR, a boxed ambients calculus with Distributed Role-Based Access Control, where the privileges
associated to processes change during computation and are determined by their location, their owners, the roles they
have activated, and the security policy. The distributed nature of the RBAC mechanism comes from the fact that each
ambient controls the security policy authorizing the entrance of ambients and each port specifies the security policy
controlling the reading and writing privileges.
Our type system prevents two forms of security violations, those consisting of attempting to enter an ambient
without proper authorization, and those consisting of trying to read or write from ports without the corresponding
permissions. These security violations are controlled using roles, which can be dynamically activated and deactivated.
The type system prevents security violating actions by those processes not vested with the required authorizing roles.
Our main contribution is the design of the first ambient calculus with a distributed RBAC mechanism where the
location of a process conditions its mobility and its ability to communicate with other processes. Our main result in
Theorem 6 shows that a well-typed program never violates the dynamic security checks.
Although the classroom example in the introduction and Section 5 is focused on Internet networking for a sense of
location and communication, our Distributed RBAC mechanism should be applicable to other settings such as those
arising from mobile telecommunications.
The area remains full of open and challenging problems. An interesting aspect to consider is the notion of trust
in such a way that the access control policy governing the users’ requests will further depend on whether the user
is in a trusted or untrusted domain. Furthermore, RBAC can be enriched by placing order structures on roles (role
hierarchies), constraints on roles such as mutual exclusion (no user may activate two given roles at the same time),
combination of roles (two given roles have to be activated at the same time), and composition of roles (users having
a given role are given another role). Defining type systems to address these richer notions of RBAC is the subject of
our ongoing and future research.
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